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Interest Domination as a Framework
for Exploring Channel Changes
in Transforming Economies
Debra Jungman Dahab, James W. Gentry, and Ravipreet S. Sohi
Department of Marketing, College of Business Administration, University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Abstract
Changes in political and economic power can affect channel structures and decisions. Western
channel models may not be useful for understanding the process of change in Central and East European transforming economies. This discussion suggests that channels in transforming economies
may be controlled by groups or networks of people with mutual interests, a phenomenon the authors call interest domination. The article examines interest domination by managers, Communist
cadres, and other party elite in two transforming economies and describes how structural and behavioral components of command economies might be conducive to interest domination of marketing channels. Propositions for explaining the political, social, and economic factors that sustain interest domination and contribute to change in interest-dominated channels are offered. Examples
from Hungary and Tajikistan are used to provide context for the discussion.

E

monitoring the move toward a market economy in Central and Eastern Europe
have focused on macroeconomic goals, such as the
development of financial, regulatory, and legal infrastructures; the transfer of public property to private sector owners; and currency stabilization and
convertibility. From a marketing channels perspective, all of these issues are important in facilitating
the development of channels that meet consumer
needs, encourage economic development and reinvestment, and provide linkages to external markets.
As Savitt (1992) suggests in the context of privatization, however, current analyses place too much emphasis on overall economic outcomes, particularly
the development of markets, at the expense of attention to the process of achieving these goals. It is
important to understand the process of market development to explain differences in the rate and direction of social and economic change.

In evaluating the public policies driving institutional changes in Central and Eastern Europe, several recent articles have advocated a Shumpeterian perspective, which suggests that it is better to
build on existing skills, history, and values than to
try to eradicate the old ways completely and start
with new institutions, norms, and personnel (Murrell 1992; Nason, Carman, and Dholakia 1992; Voszka 1991). For Central and Eastern Europe, this
means that along with existing cultural values and
managerial skills comes the “baggage” of the old
way of doing business, including the social networks among managers that resulted in decisions
based on personal outcomes rather than organizational efficiency and effectiveness (Economist
1995a,1995b; Nagy 1993; Voszka 1991).
This phenomenon of social networks and the resulting outcomes can be called interest domination; this article contends that it is one factor that

conomists
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can accelerate or retard change in transforming
economies. Investigating and understanding interest-dominated channels in transforming economies
may help Western marketers examine channel operations and social effects in an environment whose
political, economic, and social experiences and values may differ from those used to model Western
channel issues.
The objective herein is to provide a framework
for understanding channel changes taking place in
transforming economies. The article views channel
structure as composed of relationships embedded
in a historical, political, and personal context. The
process of change is premised on a context in which
these social networks of shared interests have resulted in high barriers to entry for local entrepreneurs, with the consequence being limited diffusion
of accumulated wealth across social groups. Based
on an examination of two countries in different
stages of economic and market development (Hungary and Tajikistan), explanations of how social, political, and economic changes affect changes in distribution systems are proposed. Understanding how
such countries as Hungary are developing a market
and channel structure can help researchers understand and guide the process in countries like Tajikistan, which lag behind in both market and economic
development.
The discussion is presented in three sections.
The first introduces the concept of interest domination in marketing channels and provides a
theoretical base. Drawing on existing theoretical models in the network, political economy, and
ethnodomination literatures, the authors present
interest domination as a context-specific governance structure. The next section uses two countries with transitional economies, Hungary and Tajikistan, as examples to describe the development
of interest domination. This section examines how
interest domination is developed and sustained,
then addresses the issue of how interest-dominated channels change. The final section of the article discusses how interest domination contributes
to an understanding of the process of transformation and economic development.

9

Interest Domination
Interest domination is the control of distribution
channels in a specific industry or geographic area, or
both, by an isolated group of economic actors. This
dominant group controls resources and concentrates
power to the extent that an insider/outsider culture
develops. Outsiders have limited access to capital
and ownership opportunities. Insiders usually share
a common background, common values, or common
experiences that set them farther apart from other individuals or groups. The focus of this article is groups
of former Communist cadres, political elite, or enterprise managers under command regimes.
The theoretical base for interest domination is
drawn from three streams of research: the political
economy framework, network theory, and the sociological concept of ethnodomination. Political economy models contribute the motivation and environmental variables. Network theory focuses on the
group and promotes understanding of how relationships among individuals produce trust and provide
transaction value. The concept of ethnodomination
provides the basis of a framework for relating interest domination to environmental change. The Figure illustrates how interest domination draws from
these three research streams.

Political Economy Framework
In marketing, the political economy framework has
been used to examine the interplay between power
distribution and resource allocation within a channel of distribution. According to this approach, a
channel of distribution represents a political economy in which, as Benson (1975) notes, the primary
concern is ‘’the distribution of two scarce resources,
money and authority” (p. 229). Relatively less attention has been given, however, to the application of
the framework on a macro level (Robicheaux and
Coleman 1994), where the channel of distribution is
analyzed as embedded within economic and political institutions.
Arndt (1981, 1983) characterizes political economy as an institutional approach to marketing, meaning that the focus is on the rules and
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conditions that govern transactions. Again, these
rules can develop within a channel of distribution
as a function of political and economic conditions,
such as the relationship between the use of power
and market conditions (Frazier and Kale 1989).
The rules and conditions can also arise from governmental regulations that directly or indirectly affect distribution channels or from historical or cultural norms affecting the distribution of political
and economic power. According to Arndt (1981), political economy “links economic processes to organizational structure and goals and the influence of
important stakeholder groups” (p. 40). In the context of a transitional economy, political economy allows the analysis of channel development to go beyond the effects of the change from a sellers’ to a
buyers’ market by incorporating variables relating
to political elements both internal and external to
the channel.
The political economy framework serves two
functions for the purposes of this discussion.
First, it is sensitive to environmental change,
in both the economic (resource) and polity (social power) dimensions. Transitional economies
are undergoing tremendous economic changes at
varying rates, and channels of distribution will be
affected by both changes in external rules governing channels and corresponding changes in the
distribution of power among stakeholder groups.
Second, it implies that the motivation of channel
members, or all stakeholders for that matter, is
to maximize their level of resources and authority. This suggests that stakeholders from the Communist era will struggle to maintain their control
over the allocation of resources and the distribution of power, and that their success in doing
so may be one factor that accelerates or retards
channel change.
The concept of interest domination assumes that
stakeholders form homogeneous groups based on
common interests and values. Therefore, while political economy provides the motivation for group
behavior and lends justification for the interaction between economic and political elements, network concepts strengthen the analysis of how these
groups accomplish their goals.
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Network Theory
In the marketing literature, a network approach
views firms or individuals as embedded within the
channel’s social and political structure. Networks
of firms or individuals provide value, in the form
of trust, power, and resources (Anderson, Hakansson, and Johanson 1994; Thorelli 1986), that affects
economic decision making (Granovetter 1985). Networks are accepted as a form of governance structure that falls between Williamson’s (1975, 1985)
markets and hierarchies, providing more advantages than either one in terms of overall utility
(Heide 1994; Thorelli 1986; Williamson 1985). Anderson, Hakansson, and Johanson (1994) argue that
networks are an appropriate unit of channel analysis because transaction partners actually are connected beyond the dyad to numerous other partners, to the extent that changes in the circumstances
of one party affect the other parties in the network,
not just a single exchange partner. They suggest
that, in a channel of distribution, the network context mediates between the external (macro) environment and the task (firm) environment. This is a
significant recognition of the importance of analyzing and understanding how individuals in marketing channels behave in groups or networks that are
not firm based.
In the context of channels in a transforming economy, a network consists of relationships among individuals involved in economic activity. The network
is a collection of individuals; therefore, the unit of
analysis can be the network or individuals acting in
response to the network environment. A key issue
is the ability of the group to “control” the economic
activities of its members, because the ultimate economic power rests with the group. Applying a network perspective to the issue of channel changes in
a transforming economy suggests that those networks of stakeholders that existed under the previous system may still provide access to resources and
the power necessary to enhance one’s relative position when the macro economic and political environments are unstable. Particularly when legal systems
and institutions are nascent or nonexistent, network
models suggest that managers may rely on informal
support systems to realize their goals.
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Figure 1. Theoretical bases of interest domination in transforming economies

Ethnodomination
Network models are just beginning to examine issues of social change (Portes and Sensenbrenner
1993), and the concept of change has not been explored within the marketing literature on channel
networks. Political economy, in turn, only suggests
which variables are important in a changing environment. Here, the literature on the ethnodomination of trade (Bonacich 1973; Smith 1976; Speece
1990a, 1990b) is useful in providing evidence of the
factors that are related to changes in trade channels
dominated by networks of shared ethnicity.
Evidence of ethnodomination comes from developing countries where ethnic networks control both

power and the distribution of resources, with resulting effects on sectoral policies that serve to maintain the domination. This discussion draws on the
ethnodomination literature to develop the concept
of interest domination to describe channel networks
that act to accelerate or retard change in channel institutions. The process of opening ethnodominated
channels incorporates elements of acculturation
that are, the authors argue, analogous to the process
of disseminating business knowledge and changing
the entrepreneurial values of certain population segments within transitional economies. Ethnodomination studies also highlight the important effects
of changes in regional economic and spatial policy
on channel development.
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Integration of Perspectives
The approach in this article is distinct from studies that use market characteristics to explain channel structure and processes. Frazier and Kale (1989)
suggest that relationships between manufacturers
and distributors are different in sellers’ and buyers’ markets as a result of differences in economic
market antecedents. According to a political economy perspective, in sellers’ markets, manufacturers dominate the channel because of supply constraints. This may be manifested in surface rather
than deep relationships, increased use of coercive
power, long-term supply relationships that preserve
the status quo, and the use of efficiency over effectiveness criteria in evaluating channel performance
(Frazier and Kale 1989). As the economic environment of the sellers’ market opens to resources and
competition, these behavioral relationships change.
Transforming economies are in the process of moving from sellers’ to buyers’ markets in many industries, and this article focuses on the behavioral and
political processes that accompany changes in market structure.
The authors approach channel control from a
macromarketing perspective but recognize that the
problems and evidence will be industry specific. Distribution channels may vary in the degree of continuity of management through the transition from
complete continuity to complete change in management. Furthermore, the outcomes of domination may depend on the level of professional management expertise, the strength of old networks,
industry norms, and the strength of organizational
and personal objectives.
Finally, this article argues that interests change
over time, and the dominant group may change.
The focus is on domination of trade channels by
former managers, Communist cadres, or party
elite, but the presence of many groups competing
for power suggests that at some point additional
perspectives on interest domination may be useful. The key to understanding interest domination rests, not in labeling the dominant group, but
in identifying how the group achieved dominance
and whether the environmental change catalysts
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suggested herein as linked to change in dominated
channels are present.
The next section provides background information on Hungary and Tajikistan, two contrasting examples of transitional economies in different stages
of economic and market development, as a preface
to the conceptual discussion of interest domination.

Hungary and Tajikistan
While this discussion is not intended as an empirical study and relies heavily upon existing literature
in marketing and sociology, information collected
during visits to Hungary and Tajikistan during the
summers of 1994 and 1995 is used to reinforce the
context and illustrate the propositions.
Hungary is a Central European country with a
population of 10.5 million. The Hungarian economy is considered one of the front runners in the
emerging markets of Central and Eastern Europe (Economist 1994). Unlike other countries
in this region, Hungary has been very successful in replacing former COMECON trading partners and has attracted the lion’s share of foreign
investment in the region. While it is difficult to
generalize about the development of distribution channels in Hungary, the number of private
wholesaling units has increased immensely since
1989. Cash-and-carry warehouses supply smaller
businesses; larger firms often buy directly from
the manufacturer or have integrated many distribution functions. Interviews were conducted
in Hungary in 1994 and 1995 with the managing
directors of 11 companies engaged in consumer
goods wholesaling and retailing.
Tajikistan, a former republic of the Soviet Union,
gained its independence in 1991. Its economy is in
the early stages of transformation, and the distribution channels for most products are still in their infancy. In the agricultural sector, the “bazaar” system
is still common, with buyers and sellers of produce
interacting in a large central marketplace. For manufactured goods, complete collapse of the state-run
system has created a vacuum in the distribution sector. A class of distribution entrepreneurs is slowly

I n t e r e s t D o m i n at i o n

and

Channel Changes

in

Transforming Economies

emerging, but growth of the sector is severely handicapped by the lack of such market institutions as
commercial banking and legal infrastructure. As
later examples in this article suggest, the people
with power and connections (mostly members of
the former Communist Party) are the ones who are
able to succeed under these conditions. Given this
background, Tajikistan provides an ideal setting for
observing the role of interest domination. One of the
authors spent three weeks there in summer 1994,
visiting factories, farms, and collective enterprises
and talking with businesspeople, government officials, and private citizens.
Using the authors’ observations and other information gathered before and during these visits to Hungary and Tajikistan, the next section offers propositions to explain how interest-dominated
channels develop in a command economy and how
this domination may be sustained during the economic transformation.

The Bases of Interest Domination
This section examines how two economies in transformation from a command to a market system differ in terms of the level of domination by an insider
group that we identify as former Communist cadres,
managers, or party elite. Differences between Hungary and Tajikistan in the success of economic development policies, the level of foreign investment,
the pace of acculturation of Western values, and political reforms are discussed, as are ways these variables may affect continuing cadre domination.
The Role of the Planned Economy
In the former planned economies of Hungary and Tajikistan, planners determined outputs and then developed a matrix of the economy to identify the inputs needed to meet those goals. Channel objectives
were to (1) rationalize the flow of goods from producer to consumer, (2) minimize the number of handling stages, and (3) assure the smooth and timely
delivery of the appropriate assortment of goods
through the channel (Gogol 1963). The channel was
vertically integrated in the sense that the state was
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the sole owner of production and distribution, but
the focus was on production. The distribution or
trading function was always meant to be strictly separate from manufacturing. The major manufacturers
were large and held monopoly control over the channel and their industry (Vegh 1993).
Wholesalers served to move goods through the
channel but did not add value; most value was
added at the retail level (Jaworska 1992). There was
no market scanning for new products or sources of
supply, and credit was not offered within the channel. Referring to the textile market, one manager
observed that domestic markets were unimportant,
as the focus was on export trade with other COMECON countries. Another manager reported that
the expertise within these channels was.in the buying of imported goods and in bartering skills, not in
market forecasting and selling. Satisfaction of customers was not a transaction objective, and there
was little competition from alternate vendors because competition was not a part of the plan. Thus,
despite the official goals of distribution, there was
no accountability for failure to deliver products
in a coordinated, efficient, and timely manner because production was the only performance criteria.
Channels in Hungary and Tajikistan, for example,
were characterized by a high degree of concentration and centralization in resources and decision
making, and they were excessively long in order to
provide employment.
When business policy was liberalized in 1968, efficiency became a concern; one example of reform
was the rationalization of retail clothing outlets by a
Hungarian textile company. Still, product differentiation and assortment were not objectives; wholesale
and retail markets were segmented by broad product category and by geographic location, rather than
by consumer needs and shopping patterns. For example, Vegh (1993) reports that a small Hungarian
shop might sell soap, underwear, beverages, cigarettes, shirts, toys, and books.
Government policies can affect channel structure and may be conducive to trade domination in
several ways. Regional economic policies allocate
money for infrastructure improvement and business development, affecting the spatial development of trade. The economic and spatial policies of
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a planned economy are similar to those in countries
where ethnodomination of marketing channels exists (Speece 1990a, 1990b). Smith (1974) and Speece
(1990a, 1990b) describe ethnodominated channels
as spatially dendritic market structures connecting
smaller markets in the hinterland with progressively
larger markets. The vertical nature of market transactions precludes competition from enterprises in
similar-sized trading cities in a specific product
market. The hierarchical structure culminates in a
single, large, export-oriented trade center. Because
of the dendritic structure, small markets are dependent on a single supplier or buyer; hence, the monopolistic character of the channel is preserved. As a
result of these trading patterns, economic development is slow and uneven, both spatially and among
population segments (in terms of distribution of
income).
Spatially, the old Communist distribution channels could also be described as dendritic, with hierarchical rather than vertical market supply linkages. During the days of strong central control in
Hungary, the ministries dominated distribution
channels, partly through regional economic development policies. The distribution of the urban
population was uneven; Budapest dominated trade
markets at the top of a pyramid of cities, an artifact of policies that concentrated development resources. Despite later attempts to encourage more
even growth, few medium-sized cities existed
to serve as regional distribution centers (Bartke
1989). Until recently, the distribution system had a
wheel-like configuration, with transportation networks funneling all goods from smaller communities directly to Budapest. Now, new roads are being
constructed to connect existing medium-sized cities, which could have major effects on trading patterns and opportunities. Such regional inequities
also may have affected the political clout of managers from outlying areas. For example, according
to Racz (1994), professional managers from other
towns or villages have difficulty entering the Budapest business community.
The organizational and physical characteristics of
distribution channels in planned economies suggest
the first proposition.
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Proposition 1: Vertical supply linkages in
distribution channels, such as those in
planned economies, provide a structure
that is conducive to interest domination.
While these organizational and physical characteristics facilitated interest domination, the characteristics of the group itself or its social structure represent the fundamental variable in explaining how
these networks originated and are sustained. The
next section looks at these issues.
Social Networks
The control system of the command economy was
based on strong networks of individuals sharing a
common political and economic philosophy. This
section identifies two characteristics of networks
that contribute to interest domination. The first is
the isolation of the group from the general population, and the second is group cohesiveness. The latter, it is suggested, permits group control over access to valuable resources through the concept of
enforceable trust.
In ethnodominated channels, the evolution of
control within the channel is based on strong cultural ties. Bonacich (1973), Smith (1974), and Sowell (1994) describe the special characteristics of ethnic groups that exercise monopoly channel control.
Sowell (1994) suggests that the distinct entrepreneurial values of these groups isolate them from the
indigenous population. Bonacich (1973) and Smith
(1974) describe sojourners who, in addition to their
entrepreneurial values, have a strong attachment
to their home culture and maintain a separate cultural identity. These groups represent a closely knit
community, sharing and preserving common values and economic goals. One might expect strong,
closed communications networks based on common interests and weak ties to the host culture because of the isolation of the group ethnically, culturally, and economically. Portes and Sensenbrenner
(1993) suggest that isolation contributes to the solidarity of the group, which aids the group in developing and sustaining economic reciprocity. They
further assert that as isolation becomes more pronounced, solidarity increases, barriers to exit
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increase, and subsequently isolation and solidarity
are strengthened.
In interest-dominated channels, isolation may
be based, not on ethnic differences, but on a political and managerial culture or on the expertise, values, experiences, and social networks that bind the
managerial elite and distinguish them from other
groups. For example, Nagy (1993) describes the
‘’inbreeding’’ that occurred among Hungarian technocrats and managers during the 1980s, such that
managerial skills could only be acquired in a managerial position, and lateral reassignment replaced
upward mobility as a career pattern. He labels these
groups the “new bourgeoisie” because they began
to accumulate personal wealth in a socialist society, and he suggests that this “embourgeoisiement”
occurred under odd conditions-a monopoly market
and a hierarchical communication and management
structure. The only “oddity,” however, stems from
an attitude—behavior inconsistency. From a purely
economic perspective, the behavior was the manifestation of an insider coalition’s goal of accumulating control of resources and power and the ability
of the group to “control” the behavior of individual
members to perpetuate its economic position.
Nagy’s (1993) comments are themselves indicative of a split between social groups—those who
profited from their positions during the early days
of the transformation and those who did not because they were not part of the network. Portes and
Sensenbrenner’s (1993) insights about the solidarity of immigrant groups suggest that interest domination has been affected by, not only the presence
of these groups, but also the degree to which the
in-group is polarized or isolated from other social
groups, during both Communist rule and the ensuing economic transformation. Isolation is also related to economic success; the success of the ingroup during the transformation will continue to
isolate them from the out-groups and sustain their
power and economic advantage. This leads to the
second proposition.
Proposition 2: Isolation of the dominant interest
group from the rest of society contributes to
interest domination and to the continuing
economic success of the dominant group.
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Access to Resources
Instrumental to the value of networks is the ability
of in-group members to provide one another with
access to resources that enhance economic power.
Under the planned economy, social relationships
arose to facilitate transactions, often outside official channels (Nagy 1993; R6nas-Tas 1991, 1994;
Stark 1990,1992). For example, during a shortage,
a connection to a wholesaler might be essential to
providing sufficient product to meet sales targets.
Nagy (1993) argues that new business forms and
institutions have preserved the information power
and relational structures of former exchange networks in Hungary because “the cohesive force is
no longer a shared ideology but shared interests”
(p. 83). Thus, the tie that binds has changed from
commitment to a philosophy to protecting and enhancing economic turf, although some would argue that the pursuit of economic self-interest has
always been the underlying goal. This description agrees with the “power conversion” thesis described by R6nas-Tas (1994) or the “political capitalism” of Staniszkis (1991), which suggests that
cadres were able to use their official positions in
the waning days of the old system to acquire assets
in the new market economy.
One explanation for the apparent sustained value
of cadre connections is what Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) call enforceable trust. In their analysis of the social capital of immigrant groups, they
identify enforceable trust as community expectations that affect economic goals and goal-seeking
behavior. The community has the power to sanction
or reward the behavior of its members by providing
or denying access to important economic resources.
The trust involved is the knowledge that community
members will follow community rules; enforcement
comes from the ability of the group to withhold or
provide resources. Kadushin (1995) points out that
enforceable trust extends beyond the dyad and is really a web or network phenomenon.
Róna-Tas (1994) offers empirical support for notion that the value of former Party connections in
current business transactions may be interpreted as
social capital in the form of enforceable trust. Based
on self-reported responses to a random survey of
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Hungarians conducted in 1991, he found that former cadre (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party)
members were more likely to be engaged in corporate business than were nonmembers. This relationship persisted even when education was entered
into the model.
In contrast, while former cadres participated
in noncorporate, entrepreneurial positions and in
farming to a greater extent than did noncadres, human rather than political capital was the explanation. Education accounted for the variation between
the groups in participation in farming and noncorporate ventures and in reported income from these
activities. For cadres in corporate business, however, cadre status contributed to income differentials that could not be accounted for by differences
in education. These findings support our contention that, for some groups, past associations provide
economic value in specific contemporary contexts.
This value can come from enhanced access to property and business opportunities arising from the political process or through the benefits provided by
the networks of personal, political, and business
relationships.
Current business relationships seem to be a matter of trust in Hungary, in terms of access to both
capital and supplies. As one successful entrepreneur commented, “My 20-year reputation is my
capital. People trust my word.” This individual had
managed to use his network connections to attract
sufficient capital to build and operate a multimillion-dollar wholesale market in Budapest. In Tajikistan, where obtaining credit from a bank is virtually impossible, entrepreneurs rely on members
of the social network or family for access to capital. The trust involved is more than the interpersonal trust between the parties; it rests with one’s
reputation and standing within a broader group
of connections. One value of the trust is the continued access to resources. This suggests the third
proposition.
Proposition 3: Interest domination enhances the
ability of the network to sustain enforceable
trust by continuing to provide access to economic resources to its members.
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Environmental Variables
Underlying the concept of trust is its antithesis- distrust. The environment in many transforming economies is so fraught with mistrust and dishonesty
that trusted networks are especially valued. One
wholesaler from Veszprem, in Hungary, reported
that his firm spends considerable time and money
evaluating potential suppliers because of unfortunate experiences with dishonest traders. Therefore,
if one is a member of a network characterized by enforceable trust, the network has value beyond that
of the tangible resources that membership provides.
The value of the network is again instrumental; it
may be integral to expediting transactions under
varying degrees and kinds of uncertainty.
Without a system of contract law to protect investments and a banking system to arrange and
guarantee equal access to credit, being connected to
the “right” network may be an important advantage
and, in some cases, the only means of entrance into
the business community. Sowell (1994) offers evidence that trust among middleman minorities can
replace the need for written contracts. We suggest
that these channel networks function as transaction governance structures because the social capital and trust within the network provide rules for
conducting and monitoring economic transactions.
The fourth proposition is as follows:
Proposition 4: Interest domination is sustained
by an environment in which other mechanisms for governing transactions, such as
a legal and regulatory framework, are unavailable or underdeveloped.

The Dimensions of Change
Writing in the context of ethnodominated channels,
Speece (1990a, 1990b) notes that domination can
change (1) as government policies become more
focused on economic development, (2) as acculturation occurs and the population majority becomes
more entrepreneurial, and (3) as barriers to entry in
the retail sector fall. The authors suggest that a similar process occurs in interest-dominated channels,
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depending on the degrees of change in the policy,
social, and resource dimensions. These dimensions
are change catalysts; they represent the interaction
of forces, both external and internal to the in-group.
The process and outcomes of change in Hungary
have been different from those in Tajikistan, where
progress toward a market economy has been much
slower. Tajikistan does not have a history of early
economic reform under the Communist Party, as
Hungary does. This suggests that interest domination may be more visible in Tajik marketing channels because the factors we identify as leading to
change in these channels are not found in Tajikistan
to the same extent as in Hungary.
Sustained Control over Government
Policies
The external political and economic environment
can affect channel structure (Dwyer and Oh 1988;
Dwyer and Welsh 1985; Heide and John 1990;
Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990; Sharma and Dominguez 1992). In a transforming economy, government
policies aimed at encouraging economic development can influence changes in interest-dominated
channels. Policies can include, for example, the infrastructure improvements in Hungary that should
change trading patterns, increase market options,
and alter policies regarding the privatization of
state-owned assets. The process of privatization also
can perpetuate channel domination by the in-group,
when the group is able to influence public policy and
exclude outsiders from ownership opportunities. In
this sense, the in-group can drive external change
while protecting their position. Assuming that the
group already controls public policy, as in a cadrerun political system, the change catalyst is the opening of the political arena to other interest groups.
The privatization experience of Hungary illustrates both consolidated and diffuse control. In
1988, the momentum toward privatization culminated in the Act of Association, the legal framework for the transfer of ownership interests of stateowned assets. According to Mihalyi (1993), Nagy
(1993), and Voszka (1991), the legislation resulted
in what became known as “spontaneous privatization,” or the transfer of ownership of the profitable
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assets of state companies to managers, foreign interests, and holding companies, often at bargain
basement prices. Voszka (1991) suggests that artificial ownership structures perpetuated control by existing managers and resulted in the failure to create
strong private market interests.
The chief executive officer of a large retail clothing company in Hungry described the process of
privatization in general and explained how, in 1989,
each state-owned company was required to establish a board of directors. Many companies chose political allies and friends to be on the board, and the
result was a “quasi-ownership” arrangement where
the board approved the actions of managers and
“everyone made money,” but there were no outside
owners, no ‘’real owners” who were financially affected by performance.
Pasztor (1991) offers a detailed description of
the privatization of Apisz, a successful stationery
and paper products business, that resulted in consolidated control over distribution channels. This
can be traced to public policies that encouraged
“chain” operations. Managers were told by the State
Property Agency that companies owning “chains”
of retail outlets would be favored in privatization
decisions, and the result has been ownership consolidation and vertical integration. Proponents see
this as necessary to creating a base for retail growth,
but the policy also may undermine small business
development.
While the Hungarian public is aware of questionable transfers of power and wealth, and while writers like Nagy (1993), Pasztor (1991), and Voszka
(1991) are now free to address the issue, the process has not been entirely smooth. One Hungarian
professional commented that “these topics are not
too much welcomed. We had a peaceful change, and
this is the price we paid for a peaceful change.” A
college-level teacher commented that for many people there is little difference between the Communists and the capitalists-the economic outcomes for
the majority appear to be the same. This seems to
echo the “paradox of capitalism” described by Arndt
(1981), which can occur when stakeholder groups
succeed in eliminating competition while simultaneously professing to be true believers in the market system.
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Privatization in Hungary has created numerous
other ownership coalitions. It is sometimes difficult to trace the actual owners of a firm and their
percentage of ownership. Coalitions of managers, bankers, and local governments represent access to the necessary resources to continue operations, but the long-term effects of these coalitions
are unclear. Local governments remain powerful
forces in privatization decisions, as they own property, and difficulties have arisen in clearing property rights for transfer. Furthermore, according to
those interviewed, local government control over retail locations is a major stumbling block to the development of small business. Critics charge that
long-term lease rates have been exorbitant and fail
to reflect market value. Whether this is tied to interest domination is uncertain. It may reflect the desire of local politicians to generate wealth, or it may
indicate that local government policies are at odds
with a general emphasis on economic development.
In Tajikistan, constant political turmoil and the
continued dominance of former Communist officials have slowed the process of general economic
reform. There are still three ownership forms: stateowned companies, cooperative farms, and stock
companies. Observers report that the latter are former state-owned firms that have been privatized,
whose ownership has been transferred to managerial groups. From all appearances, the transfers
were effected by former Communist Party members
in government with whom the managers had maintained or formed social/political networks. Privatization rules favor the status quo, and managers
have been able to retain control. Sources of capital
are also based on these networks.
The fifth proposition is based on the experiences
in Hungary and Tajikistan relating to the transfer of
political power during the transformation.
Proposition 5: Interest domination is sustained
by the ability of the in-group to control
public policy affecting channel and economic development.
The next section suggests that a pattern of interest domination may be altered when other groups
develop the political and economic power to change
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policies that have perpetuated insider ownership of
assets and access to markets.
Resource Alternatives
Isolation of the in-group has been identified as a
factor leading to the continuation of interest domination. The degree of isolation is related to the
openness of the market to foreign participants who
provide both outside capital and new ways of doing business. As Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993)
argue, the ability of a group to sustain enforceable
trust is inversely related to the options for economic
opportunity available outside the focal community.
This section offers evidence that supports their contention in the context of a transforming economy
by examining the effect of multinational companies
(MNCs), trade policies, and world trading agencies
on marketing channels. These forces affect channel
domination through their influence on public policy
and by bringing new ideas and ways of doing business and providing an alternative source of capital
and other types of assistance to both in-group members and outsiders.
The Hungarian economy was open to foreign investment before the economic and political changes
of 1989, but it has grown dramatically since then
(Economist 1994). As MNCs bring external resources
for local development, they acquire considerable influence in government and business decisions. This
may result in an opening of interest-dominated channels as new players emerge, or it may solidify and
entrench the current elite through the formation of
powerful coalitions with outside owners. The deciding factors may be the effects of MNC entry on industry concentration and competition. If a previously
dominated channel remains competitive, and control
is dispersed among several players, it can change. In
Hungary, the perception of a new kind of domination
by foreigners is a concern. One respondent used nationality to describe channels with considerable foreign ownership, such as the “Austrian” retail food
products channel. Similarly, products manufactured
by Hungarian firms with multinational ownership
are no longer viewed as “Hungarian.”
Multinationals or entrepreneurs from outside
groups also provide capital, information, and other
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types of business assistance to the local population.
This outside assistance gives members of the ingroup an alternative pool of resources that weakens
in-group ties and may provide outgroup members
with the assistance necessary to begin a meaningful business endeavor. This fits, in part, Speece’s
(1990a, 1990b) description of the opening of the retail sector. In dominated channels where supply restrictions have been relaxed, outsiders may have access to supplies and limited capital to begin small
retail enterprises, but many of these remain at the
subsistence level because sufficient resources and
knowledge are not available locally to promote real
growth of the retail sector.
In Tajikistan, in contrast to Hungary, foreign domestic investment is small. This is in part a function
of the uncertain legal and regulatory infrastructure;
while laws governing foreign investment exist, the
government instability makes it unclear whether they
will be enforced or changed. Members of the in-group,
however, have international connections developed
through their political positions, and thus have access
to travel documents, goods, and capital. Private traders with connections charter airplanes and buy goods
abroad for domestic resale at a substantial profit. Ingroup membership is integral to one’s personal economic success, and the role of the group in enforcing trust among its members is sustained, in part,
because the external environment is not conducive to
the development of alternatives. Proposition 6 summarizes the effect of resource alternatives.
Proposition 6: In the absence of a coalition between the in-group and international traders, the involvement of international trading groups in the local economy may
a) weaken interest domination by the ingroup, and
b) contribute to a breakdown of enforceable
trust within the in-group.
The Social Process of Assimilating
Business Values
The degree to which an economy is open to global
trade is related to the final change catalyst, the
social process of changing business values. In
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ethnodominated channels, acculturation represents a two-way exchange of cultural and business
values. For example, in Thailand, Chinese Thais initially were more entrepreneurial than the indigenous Thais, but through acculturation have become
more like them culturally, while the latter have adopted the entrepreneurial values of the Chinese minority (Gentry, Jun, and Tansuhaj 1995; Thorelli
and Sentell 1982).
In interest-dominated channels, acculturation may
be largely unidirectional. Groups with a monopoly
on business skills and entrepreneurial values have to
transfer these to the population at large for assimilation of business values to occur, a process much
like acculturation. Traditional socialist values favored
societal gain over personal gain; there have been reports of resistance to capitalism among groups in
transforming economies that goes beyond resistance
to the current regime. In a sense, this represents a
cultural lag, that is, the system is changing more rapidly than people’s attitudes and values.
As the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
move toward social democracies and capitalist economies, one challenge is to achieve a balance between
the right of individuals to gain from production and
the need for contributions to programs that benefit
society as a whole. In Hungary, assimilation may involve the transfer of business knowledge and skills
more than a change in social and entrepreneurial values. This seems to fit with the findings of Róna-Tas
(1994) on the success of cadres in business endeavors.
For example, one manager reported that it was extremely difficult to convince traders in a large wholesale market about the value of differentiating their
businesses with signage and providing other kinds of
information to prospective buyers. Public policy decisions regarding the funding of business training programs also affect the transfer of business knowledge.
In Tajikistan, interviews revealed very limited
knowledge, at the enterprise level, of the role of
profit in business management. Even in firms with
foreign ownership, there appeared to be little assimilation of entrepreneurial values; foreigners and
natives seemed capable of maintaining their separate knowledge and value systems. The process of
assimilation in Tajikistan may be initiated as the
children of elite managers are educated abroad and
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bring business knowledge back home, but this does
not mean that entrepreneurial values will diffuse beyond the in-group.
This discussion leads to the final proposition.
Proposition 7: The continuation of interest domination is inversely related to the rate of assimilation of entrepreneurial values.

Contributions and Future Issues
This article provides a framework for looking at the
process of change in marketing channels in Central
and Eastern Europe. The concept of interest domination is presented as a variable that moderates the
relationship between the external, or macro, world
and the firm environment and can accelerate or retard change. In summarizing the framework, several
important points should be emphasized.
Contributions of the Model
Catalysts to Change
One contribution of the framework described in this
article is the identification of factors in the external
political environment that are catalysts to channel
change. As Robicheaux and Coleman (1994) point
out, this particular area of channel research has been
neglected. This model represents a first step toward
further investigation of the external influences on
channel change in the context of influence patterns.
Cultural Lag
An important concept in the process of change in
interest-dominated channels, cultural lag, suggests
that behavioral elements lag behind economic ones.
Even as seller’s markets are changing to buyers’
markets, people try to preserve old behavioral patterns and cling to outdated values and suspicions.
Valuable Skills
The process of change can be positive if the value of
experience and skills developed under the socialist
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system is recognized and if outsiders understand the
role of personal networks in reducing uncertainty
in the current environment. Interest domination,
in the long run, may be an important facilitator of
change.
Role of Government
In transforming economies, governments play an
extremely important role in the process of change
and can be a determining factor in whether interest domination will continue. Reports of corruption
among business and government officials must be
understood within the framework of change and the
desire of those involved to preserve and protect resources and authority and reduce uncertainty.
Predictive Value
Interest domination is an important variable in the
rate of change in transforming economies. By confirming or denying the existence of factors that sustain or reduce interest domination, marketing researchers can predict how quickly change may occur
and then develop strategies to direct the process.
Individual Actors
Interest domination focuses on relationships among
individuals that cut across firm boundaries. While
the relationship of the individual to the group is integral in perpetuating domination, the individual is
the economic actor making decisions. Research on
the social context of trade relationships has focused
on the firm, rather than the individual, as the unit
of analysis (Anderson, Hakansson, and Johanson
1994). Interest domination suggests that this may
not be the appropriate approach in certain contexts,
such as a transforming economy.
Stark (1990) describes cohesive networks of
trust, cross-ownership, and stable contracting that
he asserts function similarly to Japanese business
networks, in which interpersonal relationships
are crucial. The authors argue that, in the Hungarian context, there is little or no firm identity as
yet. The larger firms were state-owned, but “deals”
were made between individuals. Small firms in the
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former second economy were represented by the individual entrepreneur. While larger firms with foreign ownership are trying to build firm identity, in
many cases this identity is still securely tied to owners or managers (Dahab 1995; Stark 1990).
MNCs as Powerful Players
Finally, with the increasing importance of world
trade to these economies, governments may find
their role diminished by the power of MNCs and
world trading organizations. Boddewyn and Brewer
(1994) suggest that, in a global trading environment, MNCs approach governments as resources
to be controlled, rather than as constraints to activities. This may be particularly applicable in transforming economies struggling to enter global markets rapidly and to halt rising external debt and
growing trade imbalances.
Future Efforts
It is important to approach research and management issues regarding Central and Eastern Europe
with three caveats. First, a Western orientation may
not be appropriate for either academic analysis or
managerial decision making. Nason, Carman, and
Dholakia (1992) emphasize this point when they
suggest that channel mapping to document existing transaction patterns and relationships should
precede normative research. The ethnodomination
studies by Speece (1990a, 1990b) also demonstrate
that non-Western models are appropriate for studying channel operations and change in underdeveloped countries.
Second, the political and economic situation in
Hungary and throughout Eastern Europe is dynamic and affects channel decisions. The writings
of Denitch (1992) and others suggest that the “politocracies” of the socialist era may be flourishing in
capitalist guise. Denitch’s (1992) arguments about
the “Mexicanization” of Central and Eastern Europe
focus on the potential for a dual economy composed
of the managerial elite and a subsistence labor class.
This concept is strikingly similar to ethnodominated outcomes. Ethnodomination provides the
framework for looking at what could happen in

21

Central and Eastern Europe if the politocracy continues, and it also provides guidance on how change
may occur. Interest domination of marketing channels is one manifestation of tightly held political
and economic power. Integral to change in interestdominated channels are the assimilation of business
knowledge and values by the general population
from the entrepreneurial elite and broader access to
capital resources. Recognizing that change will occur and using public policies to guide the process is
one approach. As trade barriers fall and markets develop, one concern is that indigenous firms will not
be able to compete with MNCs, and the result may
be the loss of local jobs. This has a direct effect on
channel decisions.
In the face of political and economic uncertainties
and the lack of entrepreneurial experience in Hungary, Tajikistan, and other Central and Eastern European countries, MNCs have difficult decisions to
make regarding channel selection. Many have chosen to develop their own distribution systems, some
have been able to work with local entrepreneurs, and
others have built alliances with state-owned or newly
privatized companies (Dahab, Marquardt, and Gentry 1994). Speece (1990b) suggests that it is important for MNCs to work within the system, that is, to
use local channels whenever possible to enter the
market. Considering the prevailing sentiment and
concerns about foreign competition, firms that use
local suppliers or distributors may have at least a political advantage over those with their own channels.
Finally, it is important to understand the process
of assimilation and how it applies to Central and
Eastern Europe. Ignoring the expertise of technocrats or managers because of their prior connections
may not be an efficient way to build a solid base for
a new economy. As Speece (1990b) suggests within
the context of ethnodominated channels, purging
old institutions, values, and resources without having replacements is unwise. Recognizing them and
incorporating them into a strategy is more prudent.

Conclusions
The focus of marketing research on Eastern Europe
thus far seems to be on understanding developing
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markets, rather than the role of marketing in economic development. This article integrates the two
perspectives by exploring how channel domination
can affect market structure, which is related to economic development. The concept of interest domination can help explain and predict the changes
occurring in distribution channels in transforming
economies.
This article suggests that managerial carryover
from the Communist era and the delineation of
other cohesive group interests may be affecting current distribution decisions. The outcomes may include monopolistic structures, higher prices, a lower
supply response, and uneven distribution of income
before adjustments. Countries such as Hungary,
where economic progress has been rapid and political reforms have been extensive, may not demonstrate the level of interest domination of marketing
channels found in a less developed market economy, such as Tajikistan. In Hungary, barriers to entry in retail and wholesale sectors are falling and a
regrouping of business relationships is occurring.
The process of assimilating business values may be
slow. Public policies can help by stimulating development of small and medium enterprises. Eventually, business relationships will adjust to the new
climate.
Finally, understanding the process of change in
interest-dominated channels can enhance investment opportunities and business outcomes. Knowledge of how these channels change through the process of assimilation offers marketers a framework
for evaluating channel decisions, as well as future
opportunities for research regarding how public policies, social ties, shared experiences, and relationships affect both channel decisions and economic
outcomes.
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